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I
JN THE FIRST JUDICI/>.L DISTRICT COURT
OF Cl\CHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EDWIN GOSSNER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

v.

)
}
)
)
)
)

0 RD ER

Case No. 16062

UTJ\ll PONER AND LIGHT, a Utah
)
corporation, THE STATE OF UTAH,)
by and through its Division
)
of State Lands,
}
Defendants.

)
)

The above captioned matter came on for hearir;g on
motions this 19th day of June, 1979, plaintiffs appearing by,
through their attorneys, Robert C .. Huntley, Jr., and Gordon J,
Low, and defendant, Utah Power and Light, appearing through i:
attorneys, Albert J. Colton and Anthony L. Rampton, and defoi
State of Utah, appearing through its attorney, Hichael M. Quea:
and the Court having considered the briefs and arguments of c:
enters its Order on motions as follows:
(1)

The State of Utah is hereby dismissed from the

action without prejudice.
0

(2)

The Court rules as a matter of law that the on:

liability of the defendant, if any, will be limited to floodi:
resulting from the filling of the river channel with silt if
.

u
Fl
}':

caused by the erection of the Cutler Dam; and that the de~eni t;
will be liable absolutely for damages occasioned thereby.
other words, the tort cormni t ted by the Utah Power and Light

j

_I
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In b,,

company, if any, for which it may be liable to the plaintiffs is
the blocking of the channel of the Bear River by silt caused by
the erection of the Cutler Dam.
The Court further rules as a matter of law that with
regard to the release of waters the standard of care imposed upon
the defendant is established by the Kimball and Dietrich decrees,
and

inasm~ch

as it is stipulated that such releases have never

exceeded 5,500 cfs, there is no liability of the defendant eithe~
in absolute liability or in negligence because of release 9f
water £rom Oneida Dam.
(3)

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment

by Ut2.h I'ower & Light as against all plaintiffs on the ground that

the statute of limitations is a bar to the plaintiffs' claim be,
and hereby is, denied as made.
la\.;

The Court holds as a matter of

that the three year statute of limitations (which is ,applic-

able to plaintiffs' claims) began to run from the date when the
ch:i.nnel of the Bear River was filled with silt (caused by the
erection of the Cutler Dam) so as to cause flooding of the
adjacent farm land of plaintiffs.
(4)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the !-lotion for Summary

Judgment by Utah Power & Light Company as against all plaintiffs
, on the basis of rights under the Idaho Dietrich Decree and the
Ut~h

Kimball Decree be, and hereby is denied as made.

FURTHER ORDERED

that the plaintiffs' .Motion to

Stri~c

IT IS
Utah Power's

first Claim for Relief (which claim asserts that Utah Power has
the right to flood the plaintiffs based on the Kimball Decree)
b,,, and hereby is gri.lnted.
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(5)

IT IS FURTHER ORDER.ED that plaintiffs' Motion to

St·ike the Fifth Affirmative Defense of Utah Power and Light
(said defense being that the land is owned by the St:ate of Utah
rather than by the plaintiffs) be, and hereby is, granted withc:i
prejudice on behalf of the State.
( 6)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the .Motion for Summar:,

Judgment dismissing with prejudice the complaint of the plaintU

'

Ed Gessner and Josephine Gosiner, on the ground that they and

their predecessors have heretofore conveyed flood

easements~·

Utah Power ana Light Company be, and hereby is, granted.
(7)

ot

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Hotion and Stipula1

the parties to add additional parties plaint.iff and addit~m .

parties counterdefendant be, and hereby is, granted.
(8)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that th7 Countercla,im of

1I

Utah Power and Light for condemnation in eminent domain is di!J
missed without.prejudice.
I

(9)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the trial date of Jtj
I

1979, be, and hereby is, vacated, for the purpos·e of permittir.f

I

.party who desires to file notice of interlocutory appeal.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pending any interlocutorj!
appeal, that the parties may proceed with pretrial discovecy.
DATED this ~day of July, 1979.

bl

A.IH. ELLETT,

___.-;

RETIRED .JUSTICE
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EDWIN GOSSNER and JOSEPHINE GOSSNER
husband and wife; NORA BAIR; KEN BAIR
as administrator of estate of Lloyd Bair;
HOWARD K. BARLOW and DEL MARIE BARLOW
husband and wife; WILLIAM BECKSTEAD a~d
ELVIRA BECKSTEAD, husband and wife; BLANCHE
BIHGHAM; RALPH BINGHAM and JANE BINGHAM
husband and wife; BARDO M. BODILY and WANDA
BODILY, husband and wife; ALFRED CHAMBERS
and MARTHA CHAMBERS, husband and wife;
RUTH FERRIS as administrator of estate of
G. Ferris Chambers; LENNIS CHAMBERS; OLEY LLOYD
COLEY and VERDA COLEY, husband and wife; G.
ELLIS DOTY; ROBERT h'. GOODWIN and ELNER
GOODWIN, husband and wife;
THERON HANSEN and ORIS MAY HANSEN,
husband and wife, NEFF HARDMAN; HEBER HARDMAN
and SHIRLEY HARDMAN, husband and wife; VAN
JENSEN and DOROTHY JENSEN, husband and wife;
GAIL B. JENSEN and ISABEL JENSEN, husband and
,,;_ife; NEIL JENSEN and CLAR7' JENSEN, husband
and wife; ROSS LABRUM and LINTJ;>, LABRUM, husband
and wife; DUANE LABRUM; ROSS LABRUM; LEE
LABRUM; ARTHUR D. MAURER and GERALDINE MAURER,
husband and wife; LaMAR C. NIELSEN, administrator
of estates of Clayton and Beth Neilsen; STEVE
BODILY; DON E. SPACKMAN and PAULINE SPACirnAN I
husband and wife; HAROLD SPACIU!AN and MILLIE
SPACKMAN, husband and wife; LLOYD BUTTARS and
VEANA BUTTARS, husband and wife; JAi1ES SPACKHAN
and VELDA SPACK~!AN, husband and wife; BOB
SPACKMAN and LINDA SPACKMAN, husband and wife;
LeROY SPACKMAN and MARY C. SPACK~11-"\N, husband
and wife; REX SPACKMAN and MILDRED SPACIU'iAN,
husband and wife; ROSS SPACKMAN, individually,
and as personal representative of the estate
of Hyrum Spackman; VAUGHAN B. SPACKMAN and
RUTH SPACKMAN, husband and wife; C. ROBERT
TOOLSON and ELOISE TOOLSON, husband and wife;
C~-\LV/\

""'J

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

CASI: NO.

)

165S2

)

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

v:~~~

Lr

w_lf2;

OYKE nnd f,a.RE:Lt, VAf1 DYI\E, hushn.ti.(~~
hD::O:LC\ERT \.'HEELER 2nd i!TLDA l!HECLEI:,

husband and wife; LAMONTE WHEELER and NELDA J.
WHEELER, husband and wife; RAY WHEELER and
FLORENCE H. WHEELER, husband and wife; HEGAN
WHE:ELER and JONETTE W!-IEI:LER, husband and wife;

i
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RUBY WHEELER TRUST; WALLACE W. WISER and
BEATRICE WISER, husband and wife; DAVID WOOD and
CONNIE WOOD, husband and wife; MICHAEL WOOD and
RUTH WOOD, husband and wife; THOMAS WOOD and
CHARLENE WOOD, husband and wife; ELMER WOOD and
LEOLA WOOD, husband and wife; EDITH WOOD
FARNSWORTH; WALTER WOOD and NEDRA S. WOOD, husband
and wife; ROYDON STROBELT; DON SPACKMAN;
MERLIN ANDREWS; CHARLIE WOOD and BETTY JO
WOOD, husband and wife; THEADOR J. ZILLES and
LILLIE ZILLES, husband and wife; RAY ZILLES
and GLENDA ZILLES, husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

)
)

vs.

)
)

UTAH POWER & LIGHT, a Utah corporation,

)
)

Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)

REBUTTAL (REPLY) BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROH Al~ ORDER OF THE FIRST
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
HONORABLE A. H. ELLETT, JUSTICE

ii
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I.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
EDWIN GOSSNER, et al,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No. 16592

vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT, a
Utah corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.
REBUTTAL (REPLY) BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS

PURPOSE OF THIS BRIEF
This brief is to present on behalf of the appellant
Cache Valley farmers their reply or rebuttal to certain
facts,

statements and legal arguments presented by Utah

Power & Light in its answering (reply) brief.
Certain of the same issues have been briefed in the
farmers' response in the companion appeal by Utah Power,
Case No. 16573, which has been consolidated for oral argument with this case and, therefore, since our briefing in
that case will be before the Court, we will attempt not
to duplicate.
One procedural matter -- at page 3 of Utah Power's
brief, the complaint is voiced that we filed the Affidavit
of Dr. Milligan in opposition to various motions of Utah
Power & Light on the day of the hearing before Justice
Ellett.

That statement is quite correct, but counsel for

Utah Power neglect to mention the fact that Utah Power's
motions were filed and served only one day before the
hearing.
The case was set for jury trial on Tuesday, June 19,
1979, and Utah Power filed most of the motions which bring
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1

about this interlocutory appeal and served copies of those
motions on counsel the preceding day, Monday, June 18th,
which motions resulted in the loss of the trial date which
had been established by stipulation of counsel and Court Order
more than six months before.
An earlier trial date of October 1978 was lost due to

the State of Utah intervening in the case (the State ultimately being removed from the case by Justice Ellett), and
an April 1979 date was lost to the farmers due to Utah
Power's attorneys being involved in another Federal court
case.
PART I .

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ISSUE

With respect to this issue, Utah Power's Statement of
the Facts is presented in a way which possibly leads to a
misstatement of the farmers' position, and that is Utah
Power's seizing on the farmers' statements in answers to
interrogatories that the frequency of the flooding has
rendered their land "totally useless."
It is not contended that the land is destroyed, and it
is the fact, as testified to by every farmer in his deposition, that their bottom ground is some of their most fertile
ground, and in those years crops are not washed away they
get excellent crops from those lands.
In other words, the land is not destroyed, but i t is
only the fact that Utah Power has been flooding the lands
more frequently in recent years than in the past, and the
fact that Utah Power will not advise the farmers as to
whether or not to expect flaodin], results

i~

~om2

f1rrn~c 5

finding it imprudent to invest money in working of the
soil and purchase of seed.
In order that the farmers could make a determination
for the crop years 1978 and 1979 as t0 whether to plant
and attempt to mitigate their damages, the follmving interro:,
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tory was asked and the following answer given by Utah Power

& Light for the crop year 1978 (R. 418):
II INTERROGATORY
NO. 1: The Plaintiffs specifically
request t~e Defendant to answer the following interrogatory in order to assist in attempting to mitigate
damages for the crop year 1978:

•

11
'Please state whether the plaintiffs should
anticipate that their lands will be flooded
during the spring, summer and fall of 1978 due
to discharge of water from the Oneida Darn or the
backing up of water from the Cutler Reservoir.·
(This interrogatory is intended to exclude
quantities of water caused by any natural state of
the river prior to the installation of the
Oneida and Cutler Darn.) 111

11
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY #1: Defendant objects to the
form of Interrogatory #1 in that it assumes facts not
in evidence, is argumentative in nature and asks for
defendant to speculate as to events beyond its control.

(a)
Defendant does not know what plaintiffs should-anticipate;
(b)
Defendant does not know what plaintiffs mean
by 'flood.'
(c)
Defendant denies any flooding has occurred
'due to discharge of water from the Oneida Darn or
the backing up of water from the Cut~.er reservoir.'"
For the crop year 1979 the same interrogatory was served, and
Utah Power again refused to respond with a definitive answer
and simply filed an objection reading as follows (R. 505) :
"Defendant Utah Power and Light objects to the undated
interrogatory served upon it by mail.on April 24, 1~79
because it assumes a fact not established by the evidence, which this defendant denies, to-wit: that .
mere discharqe of water from the Oneida Dam or backing
uo of water from the Cutler Reservoir is the cause ot
a~y flooding to property claimed by plaintiffs."
Since Utah Power would give no assurances that it would
cease the discharging of water from the Oneida Darn in greater
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amounts than the river channel would carry, many of the
farmers felt it would be irresponsible to attempt to plant
their lands during those two

surn,~ers.

The fact is that

Utah Power did control most of the flooding as to most of
the farms in those two years, thus proving that the
flooding is not a permanent, necessary adjunct to the
operation of the system but that, rather, the flooding is
in the category of a "continuous or abatable nature" in
the context of the HAYES case, as opposed to being a
permanent injury.

The HAYES case is quoted at pages 12

and 13 of our Opening Brief.
At page 6 of the Utah Power & Light brief, O'NEIL v.
SAN PEDRO, L.A.

&

S.L.R.CO., 38 Utah 475, 114 P. 12 (1911),

is cited for the proposition that the Utah Power dams,
like the San Pedro Railroad, are permanent structures and
a continuing enterprise and, therefore, the injuries are
permanent, causing the statute of limitations to conunence
when the railroad [dam] is built.
The SAN PEDRO case is clearly distinguishable from
the instant case for the following reasons:
(a)

The Court, in SAN PEDRO, properly found

that the continued operation of the railroad would
always result in vibrating the nearby house even
when the railroad was operated in a proper and
usual manner.
(b)

In the instant case, there is no necessity

of operating the Bear River at such discharges of
water from Oneida that the capacity of the natural
channel is

(c)

exceeded~

Certainly, even in the SAN PEDRO case, the

Court would not have gone so far as to hold that the
railroad could, at its convenience and without payment or compensation for the land, run its tracks

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and its trains through the front yard of the plaintiff's
home -- likewise, it is ridiculous in the instant case
for Utah Power to assert that it can run its water

-~

...

at will outside the natural channel and over and
across the farmers' lands without either condemning
the lands or purchasing the lands.
Utah Power next cites JOHNSON v. UTAii·-IDAHO CEHT. RY. CO.,
68 Utah 309, 249 P. 1036 (1926), at page 7 of its brief,
for the same purpose as the SAN PEDRO RZ\ILROAD case.

The

UT.Z\H-IDAHO CENTPJ\L RAILROAD case is distinguishable for
precisely the same reasons as discussed above relative to
the SAN PEDRO RAILROAD case.
Utah Power quotes at page 8 of its brief that portion
of HAYES v. ST. LOUIS & S.F.R. CO., 117 Mo. App. 201, 162
S.h'. 266 (1913), which holds that where the structure is
permanent an<l causes a

perma~ent

singular and the statute of

flooding, the action is

li~itations

bars it where the

injuries are permanent.
Utah Power, in quoting to this Court thci.t portion of
the HAYES case, followed exactly the same tactic it did
before Justice Ellett by omitting to apprise either this
Court or Justice Ellett of the following wording contained
on the same page (p. 268) of the Southwestern Reporter:
" . • . but where the nuisance is of
(abatable) nature, each continuance
new cause of action, and successive
maintained for the damages accruing

a continuing
gives rise to a
actions may be
from time to time .

. Nuisance consisting of acts done, or particular
uses of property, 8ay be properly termetl 'continui~g'
rl'1h2n

they n.rl~ such a chardcte.r that ~>ey 0ay c:ontir~ue

indefinitely, or, on the other hand, Day be discontinued at any time."
(Emphasis supplied)
The fact that Utah Power was able to stop the flooding
during t!-te last three years is, at least, prirna facie

5
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.I

;1

I

.l

evidence that the injury is abatable and subject to discontinuation rather than permanent.
'i'he Court, in HAYES, quotes with approval from CARSON
v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, 53 Mo. App. 289, the following
language:
"
. When the nuisance or cause of the injury may
be removed or remedied at any tiDe, the measure of
damages is the actual damage sustained up to the date
of the institution of the suit.
Da~ages accruing
subsequently must be recovered in successive actions."
That, of course, is the situation here.

The historical

abatement illustrates this.
The record clearly establishes that Utah Power was
granted license through the Dietrich and Kimball Decrees
to discharge water through the natural channel of the Bear
River.

The record also shows that Utah Power has within

its power the ability to control the discharges at Oneida
to keep its water within the natural

c~annel.

Drawing a further parallel from the 3Jl.YES case, in
HAYES the defendant railroad was given li_cense to build a
railroad embankr:ient which did begin backing up water to
a certain level, and the Court properly held that that
embankment was not, in and of itself, a nuisance.
In the instant case, Utah Power & Light was given
authorization for three actions in question in this case:
(1)

to build Cutler Reservoir;

(2)

to build Oneida Dam and Reservoir; and

(3)

to run water between the two of them through
the natural channel.

is beyond t.he scope of its license ar,d,

thecefore, is an

abatable nuisance, and any running of waters outside the
natural channel is a proper basis for damage compensation
whenever it occurs.
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Utah Power next, at page 9, quotes KONECNY v. UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 388 F. 2d 59 (8th Cir. 1967), in
support of its position that the statute of limitations
would run at the time Utah Power's darns were built.
Again, KONECNY is distinguishable in that it involved
flooding to the plaintiff's lands which were inundated
by a reservoir when the reservoir reached its designed lake
level, the court holding that that lake level was a part
of the permanent design of the system.
In the instant case, the pernanent design of the
system neither authorizes nor requires that more water
be run through the Cache Valley than the natural channel
will hold.
The DICKINSON case cited at page 9 of Utah Power &
Light's brief is distinguishable on the same basis.
DICKS IN SON is further dis'::.ir..guisl'~able in that, in DICKINSON, ______
the fertility of the lar.ds was destroyed the year after
the dam was built, but in the instant case the lands still
have their fertility and value for raising crops whenever
Utah Power abides by the limit of its license by keeping its
waters in the natural channel.
At pages 9, 10 and 11, Utah Power quotes from the
Georgia case of SMITH v. DALLAS UTILITY CO., 107 S.E. 381
(Ga. 1921), which, again, is clearly distinguishable from
the instant situation.

The recitation of facts in DP.LLAS

UTILITY COMPANY states:
"The dam was built of concrete
feet high, there was no way to
question from being overflowed
the dara.
The darn was p~operly
maintained."

and was 30 or 40
orevent the bank in
~xcept by destroying
constr11cted and

Such is quite different than the instant case, where the
causative factor is not the height of the Cutler Dam, or
+~ Oneida Dam, the factor
·
even the presence o f tne
ups_reab
·
a·
·
,
b
'
causing the floe ing simp~y e~ng the
- d'~ scharge of :more
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water than the natural channel of the Bear River can carry,
which factor is abatable and controllable by Utah Power &
Light.
The DALLAS UTILITY COMPANY case goes on to state
what would be the rule of law under the facts of the
instant case:
"While it is true that every continuance of a nuisance not permanent and which can and should be
abated, is a fresh nuisance for which a new action
will lie (citation omitted), the facts of the
instant case fail to bring it under that well
settled rule of law."
The court then noted that the reason the Georgia case
did not come within the latter rule of law was that the
height of the dam was authorized and, therefore, not a
nuisance, and the flooding was not abatable with the water
at that level.
In the instant case, exceeding the banks of the
natural channel is not authorized and, therefore, is a
nuisance, and exceeding that channel is abatable simply by
using care and discretion in the release of waters at
Oneida, and, thus, the statute of limitations commences to
run with each new flooding and the case should be remanded
to be tried under that principle of law.
Utah Power & Light takes an interesting position at
pages 11 and 12 of its brief:
"
. it is clear that Justice Ellett's in limine
ruling in this regard is correct - i.e., the statute
of limitations began to run from the time the erection
of the Cutler dam initially caused the flooding.
"Appellants obviously deny there is any causation
at all between Cutler Dam Jnd the flooding of
appellants' lands, and, of course, are only conceding
this arguendo for purposes of the statute of limitations. If no causation is proved there would be no
liability in any event."
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Utah Power, in Section B of its Argument on the statute
of limitations question, at pages 12 through 15, misstates
the record when i t states that the two dams have been in
operation for more than 50 years, and that:
"The facts are undisputed that the manner and
method of their operation has been unaltered since
their inception, both as to the amount of water
released from the upper darn [Oneida] and as to
the water level of the reservoir behind the lower
dam [Cutler]." (Emphasis supplied)
The fact is that the method of operation of Oneida has changed,
and that fact is set out in the Affidavit of Dr. Milligan
attached to our Opening Brief as Appendix "B".
Dr. Milligan specifically stated that his studies
of the discharges from Oneida discloses that the difference
between the flooding and nonflooding years is explained by
the relatively longer periods of time of high level discharges during the flood years.
(In other words, Dr. Milligan conducted "time-duration curve"
studies based on Utah Power & Light's own discharge reports.)
Dr. Milligan's testimony is that there has been a
change in operation and, thus, Utah Power's assertion that
the operation has been unaltered since the inception of
the dams at page 13 is untrue.
PART II.

THE ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
THE EFFECT OF THE KIMBALL AND DIETRICH DECREES

The farmers have certified as an issue on this appeal
the fact that Justice Ellett's Order is in error when he

holds that the Kimball and Dietrich Decrees permit the
discharge of 5,500 cfs of water through the Cache Valley
in Utah.

9
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we have quoted the Kimball and Dietrich Decrees
extensively in both our Opening Brief in this action and
at pages 4 through 8 of our Answering Brief in the companion appeal, Civil #16573.
Additionally, the pertinent portions of both the
Kimball and Dietrich Decrees have been appended to both
Briefs.
We have specifically presented to the Court those
portions of the Decrees which state that the 5,500 cfs
figure is an authorization to collect that amount of flood
waters at Bear Lake, and have further specifically quoted
all of the portions of both Decrees which provide that the
license to discharge is only through the natural channel.
Utah Power treats this issue at pages 19 through 22
of its brief, and nowhere does it ever point out any errors
in the citations to the actual Decrees we have provided,
and nowhere does it quote any portion of the Decrees that
ever states authority for Utah Power to discharge 5,500
cfs through the Cache Valley.
The position taken by Utah Power that it can discharge 5,500 cfs even though that volume overflows the
natural channel through Cache Valley to the extent of
2,100 cfs (Affidavit of Dr. Milligan, page 2), certainly
appears to be somewhat absurd.
Perhaps the position of the parties in this case
can be best illustrated by taking an extreme example:
Suppose, instead of the Bear River channel being only
partially filled with silt, it became 100% full of
silt so that there wa::; nowhere for the water to run
where the natural chann:c•l h'lcJ be<'·:-i
-- would anyone suppose that under that circumstance
Utah Power & Light would be able to move over to
another area in the Cache Valley and run its water
down through not only the plaintiff farmers' lands,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

but a~so through the properties of the people in
the City of Logan, to get its water from Oneida to
Cutler, simply because the Kimball and Dietrich
Decrees gave it the right to discharge waters from
Bear Lake for electricity generating purposes at
all times of the year?
We submit that Judge Kimball and Judge Dietrich spoke
advisedly and with precision when they authorized the discharge only through the natural channel, because they
fully recognized that they were not hearing a suit for
eminent domain to condemn any new river channels, but were
simply involved in a suit for the adjudication of water
rights.
We request that the remand contain directions to the
Trial Court to amend its Order to provide that the maximum
discharge allowable through the Cache Valley area is that
which can be contained by the natural channel rather than
the figure of 5,500 cfs.
PART III.

THE ERROR IN DENYING RIGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE
AS TO NEGLIGENT DISCHARGE OF WATERS FROM ONEIDA
DAM

This issue is really covered by the briefing relative to
Issues I and II.
Simply stated, plaintiffs' engineering investigation
establishes that one of the major causes of the flooding
is the negligent manner in which Utah Power discharges
water from Oneida Darn at widely fluctuating volumes and
with volumes at such time durations as to make it inevitable that the banks of the natural channel through th8
Cache Valley would be breached.
This issue is plead, the fluctuations are testified
to in the depositions of at least

15 of the plaintiff

farmers, and Dr. Milligan's Affidavit sets forth the result
of his computer studies of the actual discharge data.
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Strangely enough, in face of that testimony in the recor
as to the negligent operation of Oneida, the Trial court has
ruled (prior to hearing any evidence) that he will not hear
any evidence as to the negligent operation of Oneida.

We

know of no legal precedent for the court's stating it will
not take evidence on a negligence issue when that negligence
has been properly plead and is being offered through
competent, admissible testimony.
Clearly, the Order of the Trial Court should be reversed in this regard and the Court should be ordered to
permit introduction of competent testimony on that very
proper issue.
PART IV.

THE IMPROPER DISMISSAL ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
THE COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFFS EDWIN AND
JOSEPHINE GOSSNER

The Utah Power brief, in Part III on the issue of
summary judgment of dismissal granted against Edwin and
Josephine Gassner, raises no legal issue by way of the
citations therein set forth other than Utah Power's
incorrect assertion at both pages 26 and 27 that we are
dealing with a situation where there has been no change or
fluctuation in the manner of the operation.
There has been both an increase in the volume of
water discharged and an increase in the frequency of discharge onto the Gassner farm.

Both the matter of the

increase of the burden of the flood easement and the
negligent abuse of the f'lood easement (by the Lick of care
in the time duration level of discharges from Oneida) are
jury questions, and the Trial Court's attempt to dispose
of those factual, disputed issues on summary judgment
violates both the spirit and intent of Rule 56.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Order of the
Trial Court as to the issues presented on this appeal be
reversed, and that the remand provide:
(1)

That the statute of limitations as to damage to
crops commences at the time of each successive
injury to the crops;

(2)

That plaintiffs be permitted to present testim9ny
as to the causative effect of the operation of the
Oneida Dam (and the discharges therefrom) on the
flooding which they have experienced.

(3)

That the Court be directed that the Kimball and
Dietrich Decrees permit discharges in the Cache
Valley section of the Bear River by Utah Power
up to and not exceeding the capacity of the
natural channel, and not up to the limit of

5,500 cfs, as erroneously determined by the
Trial Court.

(4)

That the dismissal of the claims of Edwin and
Josephine Gessner on summary judgment be reversed, with directions to the Court to present
the factual questions of:
(a)

increase of the burden of the flood easement;
and

(b)

negligent abuse of the flood easement;

to the jury.
Respectfully submitted,
RACINE, HUNTLEY & OLSON
By~-,--..,----,-:::--:;;:-:-::--;:-;;:::-:;-----:;::-~~
Robert C. Huntley, Jr.

HILLYARD, GUNNELL & LOW
By~~~,..-----,--::--~~~~~~

Gordon J. Low
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that two copies of the foregoing Brief
were mailed to Albert J. Col t<;>n, 800 Continental Bank Buildinj'
231 E. 4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this 5th day
of December, 1979, in an envelope with sufficient postage
prepaid thereon.

Robert C. Huntley, Jr. -i

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

I~

"

· · ·

I

.

f

',=

,i
11

i

11

t 7s . ur~her <;>rdered that the Motion forU Summar¥=

"

~·-

Jud~me~t dismi~sing with prejudice the complaint of the
plaintiffs Edwin Gossner. and Josephine Gossner, on the .., , ·r.r"
ground that they and their predecessors have heretofo·r'~ l · ' · ·'

conveyed fl<;>od easements to Utah Power and Light be
and hereby is granted."
--··············

..

Clor~:. Su,"'l;-c · 2 c~ ~f. U:.:'.'

The issue whether or not an easement has been negligently
abused or whether the burden on the easement has been wrongfully
increased is a jury question.
Utah Power has filed as a "Third Claim for Relief"
commencing at page 4 of its Amended Answer and Counterclaim, a
defense as to the plaintiff, Ed Gossner, that the power company
holds a flood easement on his land and that, therefore, his
claim is not proper and that, additionally, he is liable for
attorney's fees and court costs for participating in this
action.
The fact is that the Gossner Flood Easement was executed
on the then existing type of operation of the river in 1953,
and that operation has changed materially in recent years so
that it is flooding more of Mr. Gossner's land at different and
more inconvenient times than existed at the time the easement
(Deposition of Edwin Gossner at pp. 48, 50, 62 and
was taken.
74) The law is, as established by a Ninth Circuit Court case
involving Utah Power & Light, that such a flood easement is
not a defense.
In GRIFFITH v. UTAH POWER & LIGHT CO. (1955), 226 F.2d
661, the Ninth Circuit Court held that even where the power
company has a perpetual easement, still it may be held liable
for damages caused by its wrongful or negligent flooding of
the plaintiff.
In GRIFFITH, the Ninth Circuit Court overruled a dismissal
granted by the District Judge on summary judgment, premised on
the existence of the easements, the Court stating at page 668:
"Even if defendant had an absolute right, under the
principle that one must not use even vested pr<;>p:rty
in such a manner wrongfully or negligently to inJure
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contends that this charge was erroneous and tha~ it
should be ~xem~t from liability for flood damage to.

~and on ~hich it held flood easements.
we find thiS t'
instru~tion.to be consistent with the holding of this

;5

Court in Griffeth '7· Utah Power & Light co., 22ii···P-.?d
661, 668-6~ (9th ~ir. 1955), which held the same 81H'Eina- c, ' 1
ant potentially liable for negligence in causing flood
damage despite the existence of a flood easement."
The deposition of Ed Gossner in this case establishes
that at the time he gave the flood easement, the Utah Power
& Light representatives advised him that there would be no
more flooding to be expected on his lands than he had been
experiencing in previous years. (Gossner Depo. at 38, 82)
The representative further told him that he could continue
to use his lands for farming purposes as he had in the past.
(Gossner Depo. at 73 and 83)
Mr. Gossner's deposition further establishes that up until
about 1960 he was making excellent use of his bottomlands, in
fact, getting two crops a year off of them by planting rye in
the fall which would be harvested in the spring for silage,
and then planting on the same ground a corn crop which would
be harvested later in the fall for silage
in fact, it was
his most valuable ground.
(Gessner Depo. at 34-35)
His deposition further establishes that commencing about
1960 the power company began to flood his lands to a greater
and greater extent where, until finally in the 1970's, he was
unable to rely on planting any of it. (Gossner Depo. at 44, 57,
67)

It is a jury question (and certainly not a matter of law
to be determined before the evidence is in) as to whether the
increased flooding on Gossner's land is due to negligence of
Utah Power.
It is further a jury question as to whether Utah Power
has increased the burden of the flooding beyond that which
was contemplated by the parties when the easement was granted.
The deposition of Mr. Gessner sets up those disputed facts
(Gossner Depo. at 36-38; 70, 72 and 92), and Mr. Gessner is
entitled to have that question determined by the jury,
· d ent being (continued on P· 21)
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